Formulating and implementing a national security strategy is, arguably, the most important single thing the U.S. government does. It is a massive enterprise involving hundreds of thousands of people and trillions of dollars — much of it invested in sophisticated high-tech weapons systems like nuclear submarines. Yet, at its heart, it requires judgments by a small number of experts and officials concerning America’s adversaries. U.S. strategy toward China or Russia depends heavily on what we think Xi Jinping or Vladimir Putin will do under various circumstances. Trying to get inside the head of a secretive, all-powerful autocrat is, at best, a difficult and uncertain business. The most difficult of all is the totalitarian leader of North Korea, Kim Jong Un.
In 2023, the U.S. will not lack for international challenges and threats. Certainly, the most intractable will come from North Korea. In the early 1950s, North Korea ignited a major war that ultimately cost the U.S. 35,000 dead out of a total uniformed force of 1.8 million. It was, by any measure, one of the bloodiest of all the world’s modern wars.
Like many wars, this one was the product of the ambitions and illusions of one autocrat. Kim Il Sung emerged out of World War II as the leader of a communist North Korean state supported by the Soviet Union and a newly consolidated communist regime in China. Kim was determined to extend his rule over the entire Korean peninsula, and in June 1950, launched an attack south. To the surprise of almost everyone, President Truman decided to come to the defense of South Korea. In November, China entered the war. The result, after three years of intense combat, was an armistice that simply suspended military operations. Korea was divided with armies from north and south facing each other across a demilitarized no-man’s land (which over the years has become an unintended refuge for wildlife).
With the battle front frozen, Kim faced a fundamental strategic choice. He could accept the fact of a divided Korea and focus on building a modern, even prosperous, North Korean state. This choice was not fanciful; it was real. But for Kim, it was unacceptable because it would mean abandoning his ambition to rule a united Korea. That left him with option two: prepare for the resumption of war to achieve ultimate victory. This option had a serious drawback: the U.S., a global superpower, stood in the way. There was another problem; neither China nor the Soviet Union wanted a rerun of the Korean War.
All of these calculations were subordinate to one overriding imperative: the power and security of the Kim family, the family dynasty, must endure. With all this in mind, Kim evidently made a fateful choice. He would protect his authority (and keep future military options open) by putting North Korea on a permanent war footing — total mobilization of the population, priority to the army and the party and a nonstop propaganda campaign portraying North Korea under threat of imminent attack by America and South Korea. There would be zero tolerance for any dissent and every citizen would have to demonstrate affirmative, enthusiastic support for the regime. It was, and is, a true totalitarian police state, complete with a vast gulag to imprison and torture political prisoners.
All this served to protect the dynasty, but it came at a cost. It severely undercut the goal of building a modern, productive economy. It left North Korea under international sanctions and cut off from its natural economic partners — Japan, South Korea and Taiwan — as well as the lucrative U.S. market. It also left the strategic objective of conquering the south out of reach.
What to do? Kim’s evident “solution” was to turn his highly militarized state into a strategic asset. Build a vast, high-profile arsenal of weapons that would be perceived by South Korea and the U.S. as dangerous and threatening. Ideally, this would bring emissaries from Washington and Seoul to Pyongyang seeking to placate a dangerous Kim regime with offers of economic assistance and strategic concessions. Under Kim Il Sung, this largely took the form of a buildup of conventional arms, including thousands of artillery pieces targeting Seoul. His son (and successor) raised the stakes dramatically by developing nuclear weapons and making sure that the world knew it. The grandson, and current leader, Kim Jong Un, has doubled down on the strategy with a huge and highly publicized missile development program, including ICBMs capable of targeting the U.S. mainland.
Despite the technological success of these weapons programs, they did not have their desired effect of forcing concessions from Washington and Seoul — until 2017. Suddenly, Kim hit the proverbial jackpot. South Korea had a new president (Moon Jae-in) who was desperately anxious to achieve a peace and reconciliation agreement with North Korea. At the same time, there was a new U.S. president, Donald Trump, with no concept of U.S. strategic interests. Trump had contempt for U.S. alliances around the world, including with South Korea. He dismissed institutional instruments of policy including the State Department and the Pentagon and adopted his own entirely personal diplomacy. He instituted contact with Kim Jong Un and was soon exchanging “love letters” with the Korean dictator. Trump, Kim and Moon met in person on two occasions — in Singapore and Hanoi. The table was set for Kim; he had two leaders willing to give him almost anything he wanted — but Kim overplayed his hand and made demands even Trump couldn’t swallow.
Now we are back at strategic square one. Kim is conducting missile tests almost weekly while threatening to restart nuclear weapons tests. Meanwhile, his country is mired in poverty and isolation. South Korea has a new president disinclined to negotiate with North Korea about anything. The Biden administration is determined not to respond to North Korean threats — except with a message that any use of nuclear weapons by North Korea will result in that country’s immediate annihilation.
The strategic stalemate between Pyongyang and Washington is now entering its seventh decade, with no end in sight.
Marvin Ott is a professor at Johns Hopkins University and senior scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center of the Smithsonian Institution. He is a summer resident of Cranberry Isles.
Marvin Ott is a professor at Johns Hopkins University and senior scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center of the Smithsonian Institution. He is a summer resident of Cranberry Isles.
